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Sincerity and the moral reanalysis of politeness in Late Modern English:  
Semantic change and contingent polysemy 
 
1. Introduction 
POLITENESS is my Theme ? To You I write, 
Who are, what all would feign be thought, Polite. 
dŚŝƐŝƐƚŚĞŽǆĐŽŵď ?Ɛǀ ?ƌŝĐĞ ?ŽƵƌƚŝĞƌ ?ƐůĂŝŵ ? 
dŚĞŝƚƚ ?s Ambition, and the SoůĚŝĞƌ ?Ɛ&ĂŵĞ ? 
dŚŝƐŝŶƚĞƌƌƵƉƚ ?ƐƚŚĞǁŝůĚWƌŽũĞĐƚŽƌ ?ƐƌĞĂŵ ? 
ŶĚŵŝŶŐůĞ ?Ɛ ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ^ƚĂƚĞƐŵĂŶ ?ƐĚĞĞƉĞƐƚ^ĐŚĞŵĞ ? 
   (Of Politeness, London, 1738) 
 
 The Reverend James Miller, in his epistle to William Stanhope, Lord Harrington, 
distinguishes his addressee, who he says is polite, from others who would like to be thought 
so. Politeness means very different things to different men; ĨŽƌƚŚĞ “ŽǆĐŽŵď ?ŝƚŝƐĂǀĂƌŝĐĞ, 
ĨŽƌƚŚĞ “ŽƵƌƚŝĞƌ ? a claim to patronage, for the lowly shopkeeper ( “ŝƚƚ ?) it is ambition and 
ĨŽƌƚŚĞ “^ŽůĚŝĞƌ ? ŝƚŝƐĨĂŵĞ ?,ĞŝŵƉůŝĞƐƚŚĂƚƉŽůŝƚĞŶĞƐƐŝƐĂŚŝŶĚƌĂŶĐĞƚŽƚŚĞ “WƌŽũĞĐƚŽƌ ?but a 
ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌƚŚĞ “^ƚĂƚĞƐŵĂŶ ?. So Miller suggests that the types he lists use 
what each would call politeness for rather different purposes.  I will demonstrate how Miller 
is able to identify particular values associated with the idea of politeness with some 
characters more than with others. I will also show how the complex polysemy of the term 
politeness thrives in the complex, fluid social fabric of eighteenth-century England.  
             Cultural and social historians have traced the history of the lexicon of politeness 
from medieval times; Peltonen (2003) examines dueling in the semantic web of courtesy, 
honour and politeness in Early Modern England, and Bryson (1998) tracks the emergence of 
civility out of the medieval notion of courtesy in early modern England.  Nevalainen and 
dŝƐƐĂƌŝ ? ? ? ? ? ?ŚĂǀĞĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞǁĂǇƐŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ ‘ƚŚĞĂďƐƚƌĂĐƚůĞǆŝĐĂůƐĞƚƐŽĨcivility, 
politeness and courtesy could be understood and represented in terms of conceptual 
ŵĞƚĂƉŚŽƌƐ ?ŽǀĞƌƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƉĞƌŝŽĚ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ?ƚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƚŝŵĞ ?ƚŚĞǇŽďƐĞƌǀĞƚŚĞ
transition in the dominant cultural discourse as evidenced of the eighteenth century in the 
Corpus of Early English Correspondence from courtesy and civility to politeness.  Langford 
(2002) offers a detailed account of eighteenth century politeness, which he aligns with three 
key cultural figures of the period: Anthony Ashley Cooper, 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Klein 
1994, 2002); the Spectator periodical (1710-1714); and Philip Dormer Stanhope, Lord 
Chesterfield, whose Letters to his Son (1774) popularised his views. Table 1 below 
summarises the characteristics of these types.  
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>ĂŶŐĨŽƌĚ ?Ɛƚypes 
of politeness 
Shaftesbury 
Characteristics of Men and 
Manners (1711) 
Spectatorial 
The Spectator (1711-1714) 
Chesterfieldian 
Letters to his Son (1774) 
Type 
Characteristics 
Cultural ethical approach 
to political philosophy 
elitist masculine 
can be learned  
code of behaviour 
realized in reciprocity, 
equality of conversation 
Sociable, public 
transparent behaviour 
can be learned  
property of interaction 
consideration for others 
  
 
Individual attribute 
formal 
elitist masculine  
can be learned  
compendium of manners 
etiquette 
Relationship to 
sincerity 
agnostic  necessarily sincere not required to be 
sincere 
    
      dĂďůĞ ? P>ĂŶŐĨŽƌĚ ?ƐƚǇƉĞƐŽĨĞŝŐŚƚĞĞŶƚŚ-ĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ ‘ƉŽůŝƚĞŶĞƐƐ ? 
 
^ŚĂĨƚĞƐďƵƌǇ ?Ɛphilosophical conception of politeness, which he located in gentlemanly 
society, ĐĞŶƚƌĞĚŽŶƚŚĞĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚŵĞŶ ?ƐŶĂƚƵƌĂůƐŽĐŝĂďŝůŝƚǇŵĂĚĞƚŚĞŵĐĂƉĂďůĞŽĨ
ethical virtue and political solidarity.  Shaftesburian politeness was regarded as a matter of 
exclusive aristocratic taste. Because his interests were primarily philosophical, I will not 
discuss his notion of politeness further here.  Spectatorial politeness was the sociable 
practice of engaging in easy, open conversation with equals in public places such as coffee 
houses and clubs.  In contrast, Chesterfieldian politeness was a matter of aristocratic formal 
ĐŝǀŝůŝƚǇ ?ƚŚĞĐƵůƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŽŶĞ ?ƐƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůĂƉƉĞĂƌĂŶĐĞĂŶĚŵĂŶŶĞƌƐŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽƐƵĐĐĞĞĚŝŶ
society. I have traced the relationships among these types as shifts of meanings that emerge 
and decline in the period (e.g. Fitzmaurice 1998, 2002a, b, c, 2010).  
            In this essay, I argue that the semasiological history of the term politeness involves 
parallel and simultaneous shifts rather than one type following another.  Instead, aspects of 
>ĂŶŐĨŽƌĚ ?Ɛ^ƉĞĐƚĂƚŽƌŝĂů and Chesterfieldian modes of politeness, co-exist and overlap in the 
discourse of the period. Their interpretation is complicated by the role of sincerity. And I 
show that the onomasiological history of the notion of politeness in the period consists of a 
constantly varying lexicon which reflects the evaluation of politeness as at once positive and 
negative.  
 
1.1. Semantic change and contingent polysemy 
           Semantic change depends upon two basic assumptions. The first is polysemy, which 
occƵƌƐǁŚĞŶ ‘ĂŶĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶŚĂƐŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶŽŶĞĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚďƵƚƌĞůĂƚĞĚŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŝƐ
ĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůůǇĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚŝƚ ? (Fitzmaurice, 2016: 258). The second is that  ‘semantic 
change (that is, change in the coded meaning of an expression regardless of its context of 
ƵƐĞ ? ?ŝƐŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇďĂƐĞĚƵƉŽŶ ‘ƉƌĂŐŵĂƚŝĐĐŚĂŶŐĞ ?ƐŚŝĨƚ ŝŶƚŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨĂŶĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶĂƐ
ŝƚŝƐƵƐĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨƵƚƚĞƌĂŶĐĞ ? ?(Fitzmaurice, 2016:260). ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽdƌĂƵŐŽƚƚ ?Ɛ
(2002) invited inference theory of semantic change, a speaker might produce an innovative 
use of an expression, building its polysemy by conveying a meaning that has the potential to 
catch on in a particular context. Semantic change then involves the conventionalisation of 
3 
 
the innovative meaning and reĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨƚŚĞĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƌĞŐĂƌĚůĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ
of use. The question is how we evaluate in social terms the nature of this changing pattern 
of polysemy which involves pragmatic strengthening and shifting prominence of pragmatic 
innovation. I argue that polysemy is structured socially. In other words, although speakers 
take polysemy for granted, at any particular time, some meanings will be particularly 
relevant or prominent than others for particular speakers, and those prime meanings will 
depend upon affective factors such as the speaker ?ƐƐŽĐŝĂů ?ƚĞŵƉŽƌĂů ?ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶƚŝĂůĂŶĚ
ideological stance. This notion ? contingent polysemy ? rests on the assumption that 
polysemies operate within the broader discourse so that questions of collocation, lexical 
variation and rhetorical variation all contribute to the discursive context. This complex 
context then allows us to identify and explore the polysemies of terms and the structure of 
their contingency.   
          Crucial to the discursive context in which the term politeness is constantly reanalyzed 
and its various meanings are foregrounded is the concept of sincerity, namely, the 
identification of feeling with its avowal. However, the notion of sincerity itself is susceptible 
to variation, resulting in a complex social, moral and linguistic set of uses. What Woodman 
 ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?ůĂďĞůƐƚŚĞ “ƐƚƌŽŶŐĐƵůƚŽĨƐŝŶĐĞƌŝƚǇ ?ƉůĂǇƐĂƉĂƌƚŝŶĞǆƉŽƐŝŶŐĂŶĚĂƚƚĞŶƵĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞ
 “ĂƌƚŝĨŝĐĞƐĂŶĚŝŶƐŝŶĐĞƌŝƚŝĞƐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚĞǁŽƌůĚ of the eighteenth century.  My treatment of 
the relationship of politeness and sincerity is rooted in the assumption that it is in 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚŽĨŽŶĞĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌƚŚĂƚƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐĨŽƌĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŶŐand 
interpreting that behaviour in social terms as polite, politic, appropriate, etc. lies.1  
Politeness is thus simultaneously politic behaviour for some and polite behaviour for others 
even as it serves as a mode of conduct, a philosophical system, a commodity for self-
advancement, a theory of sociability, for different social actors within the same historical 
space (see Fitzmaurice 2010; Haugh 2013: 54; Watts 2003: 200).  
  Key terms like politeness have complex polysemies that are structured in terms of 
the interactants and their discursive contexts. These are indexed in texts that comment on 
politeness in society, texts that seek to influence the way that politeness works in society as 
well as texts that attempt to represent the practice and effects of polite behaviour on 
society (see Fitzmaurice 2015).  In this account, I track the ways in which the meanings and 
connotations of the lexicon of politeness and polite discourse accumulate and vary, 
contingently, on use and speakers.  I argue that the disƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶ>ĂŶŐĨŽƌĚ ?ƐƚǇƉĞƐŽĨ
politeness summarized in Table 1 are ephemeral rather than categorical; different speakers 
understand (and use) politeness with the connotations that specific attributes invite 
depending upon their temporal, experiential and social stance throughout the period. 
 
1.2. Sources and evidence  
                                                 
1
 Haugh (2013: 53) observes that a key issue that has been neglecteĚŝŶŝŵ ?ƉŽůŝƚĞŶĞƐƐƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŝƐ “how 
participants (and thus analysts) know something counts as im/polite, im/proper, in/approprŝĂƚĞĂŶĚƐŽŽŶ ?. In 
my work tracking the changing meaning of politeness ?ĂďĂƐŝĐĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶŝƐƚŚĂƚƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ƌĞĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨĂŶĚ
responses to behaviour is critical evidence for the evaluation of that behaviour.    
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 My sources are drawn from Eighteenth Century Collections Online (ECCO). Key texts 
are the Spectator (1711-1714) ĂŶĚŚĞƐƚĞƌĨŝĞůĚ ?ƐLetters to his Son (1774). Other sources 
were identified by searching for full-text occurrences of key cultural terms (and their 
variants) from the historical lexicon of politeness, including politeness, civility, complaisance, 
compliment, service, good nature, good breeding, affability, artifice and flattery. These 
generated a large corpus of material and ephemeral sources which forms the rich 
intertextual research context for this study, and from which a number of excerpts were 
selected for the purpose of illustration. The history of book culture and printing allows us to 
trace readership patterns by examining the extent to which texts continue to be reproduced 
and received throughout the period. Information about the producers (and consumers) of 
these texts (discourses), their socio-economic backgrounds, their social status, and their 
audiences enriches this evidence. Contemporary documents, including literary sources, 
popular print and instructional literature, provide the basis for examining how participants 
engage with the notion of politeness and how they apprehend and interpret its multiple 
senses. Reading this material closely with an awareness of the pragmatic resonances that 
the expression and its collocates produce informs the analysis of the contingent polysemy of 
politeness.  Direct evidence is the metalinguistic and metadiscursive material that indicates 
ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐƐƚĂƚĞĚǀŝĞǁƐĂŶĚĂůůŽǁƐƵƐƚŽŝŶĨĞƌƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĨĞĂƌƐ ?ĂŶǆŝĞƚŝĞƐĂŶĚĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ
about politeness as it is identified in linguistic and other forms of behaviour as well as in its 
material accoutrements. Indirect evidence consists of examples of the linguistic 
performance of politeness in the speech and writing of characters, fiction in which speech is 
represented in dialogues and in unprinted manuscript documents, such as personal or 
familiar letters.   
 I draw upon these different types of evidence to demonstrate the extent to which 
ĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨ>ĂŶŐĨŽƌĚ ?ƐĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƚǇƉes of politeness, specifically Spectatorial and 
Chesetrfieldian, co-exist and interact in complex ways for different speakers throughout the 
period. The evidence supports tĂƚƚƐ ?ŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ “[t]he kinds of knowledge projected 
into the knowledge frame politeness may thus vary, from speaker to speaker, and, on the 
occasions of its use in social practice, different aspects of that knowledge frame may be 
mĂĚĞŵŽƌĞƐĂůŝĞŶƚƚŚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƐ ? ?tĂƚƚƐ 2011: 112). In my own terms, the result is a situation 
of contingent polysemy, in which politeness has different attributes and components for 
individual speakers, depending upon their own identities, experiences and contexts.   
In section 2, I argue that in the early part of the century there is a constant tension in 
the relationship of sincerity to politeness. This tension manifests itself in the evaluation of 
polite behaviour associated with the Spectator as negative or positive depending upon 
whether it is judged to be sincere or not.  The variety of connotations of politeness is 
marked by shifting collocation patterns.  In section 3, I argue that in the middle years of the 
century, Spectatorial and Chesterfieldian types of politeness co-exist as politeness is 
presented increasingly as a matter of form rather than the sincere consideration of the 
welfare of others. In this period, the polysemy of politeness is structured in particular social 
and temperamental ways. In section 4, I argue that the impact of the publication of 
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ŚĞƐƚĞƌĨŝĞůĚ ?ƐLetters to his Son in the last quarter of the century is the popularisation of 
Chesterfieldian politeness as etiquette and manners. In section 5, I argue that in the early 
nineteenth century, Chesterfieldian politeness undergoes a process of moral rehabilitation 
which refreshes it for use in middle class English society at the same time that sensibility, 
the late eighteenth-century reflex of sincerity, loses its own appeal.  
 
2.  The Spectator ?Ɛ sociable politeness and the problem of sincerity  
 In 1711, Richard Steele devoted an entire Spectator paper to the  “great and general 
waŶƚŽĨ^ŝŶĐĞƌŝƚǇŝŶŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?, quoting extensively from John dŝůůŽƚƐŽŶ ?ƐƐĞƌŵŽŶ “Of 
^ŝŶĐĞƌŝƚǇƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ'ŽĚĂŶĚDĂŶ ?, which was first preached in July 1694 (Bond 1965, 1: 430).  
Steele introduces the essay ďǇƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶŐƚŚĞǀŝĞǁƐŽĨŚŝƐ “&ƌŝĞŶĚƚŚĞŝǀŝŶĞ ?, a description 
that is rich with the lexicon of politeness.  Indeed, as he prepares to point to the 
offensiveness of insincere flattery in sociable conversation, he highlights a number of 
keywords that had been ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŽĨ “ƉŽůŝƚĞŶĞƐƐ ? in England since the 
seventeenth century:  
 
(1) My Friend the Divine having been used with Words of Complaisance (which he thinks 
 could be properly applied to no one living, and I think could be only spoken of him, 
 and that in his Absence) was so extreamly offended with the excessive way of 
 speaking Civilities among us, that he made a Discourse against it at the Club, which 
 he concluded with this Remark, that he had not heard one Compliment made in our 
 Society since its Commencement. Every one was pleased with his Conclusion, and as 
 each knew his good Will to the rest, he was convinced that the many Professions of 
 Kindness and Service which we ordinarily meet with are not natural where the Heart 
 is inclined, but are a Prostitution of Speech seldom intended to mean Any Part of 
 what they express, never to mean what All they express. (Steele, Spectator no. 103, 
 Thursday June 28, 1711) 
 
dŚĞĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶƐ “Complaisance ?,  “Civility ? ? “Compliment ? and  “Professions of Kindness and 
Service ? attend the description of the agile, easy marshalling of conversation among social 
equals at the beginning of the eighteenth century.  “Complaisance ?, borrowed from French 
in the course of the seventeenth century, at this time ƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽƚŚĞ “action or habit of 
making oneself agreeable; a desire and care to please; compliance with, or deference to, the 
ǁŝƐŚĞƐŽĨŽƚŚĞƌƐ ? (Oxford English Dictionary online P “complaisance ?n.).  The sense of 
 “civility ? that is implied in this quotation is ƚŚĞ “behaviour or speech appropriate to civil 
ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?OED online P “civility ? n. 12.a.). This definition is neutral; what makes the 
 “ŝǀŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ? offensive to the Divine is the manneƌŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǇĂƌĞĚĞůŝǀĞƌĞĚ P “the excessive 
ǁĂǇŽĨƐƉĞĂŬŝŶŐŝǀŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ?. ^ŝŵŝůĂƌůǇ ? “ĐŽŵƉůŝŵĞŶƚ ? (see also complement < Latin), a term 
adopted directly from French at the end of the seventeenth century,2 refers here to  “a 
                                                 
2
 ůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞĨŽƌŵ “ĐŽŵƉůŝŵĞŶƚ ?ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞOED  ? ? ? ? ? P “compliment ?n.) was adopted at the end of the 
seventeenth century from French compliment,  the form complement, taken directly from Latin, was in use in the same 
sense a century beforehand. The OED etymology contains the note that  “in Old Catalan complimento, 
Spanish cumplimiento , there was a special development of use, as in the verb (see COMPLY v.1), giving the sense 
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ceremonious or formal tribute of (mere) couƌƚĞƐǇŽƌƉŽůŝƚĞŶĞƐƐƉĂŝĚƚŽŽŶĞ ? ?OED online: 
 “complement ?n.). In ^ƚĞĞůĞ ?ƐĞƐƐĂǇ ?these expressions are harnessed for the task of 
ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐŝŶŐĂŵĂŶ ?ƐĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞin negative terms: as extreme, highly marked, as insincere.  
To explain what sincerity ? the opposite of what is implied in these terms ? consists of, 
Steele quotes liberally (yet selectively) from Tillotson. For instance, he uses Tillotson to 
lament the absence of sincerity in the ǁŽƌůĚĂŶĚŝƚƐƌĞƉůĂĐĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚ “&ŽƌĞŝŐŶDĂŶŶĞƌƐĂŶĚ
&ĂƐŚŝŽŶƐ ?, thereby juxtaposing these with the (now lŽƐƚ ?ŶĂƚŝǀĞŶŐůŝƐŚǀŝƌƚƵĞƐŽĨ “WůĂŝŶŶĞƐƐ
ĂŶĚ^ŝŶĐĞƌŝƚǇ ?.3 However although Steele does not quote it, dŝůůŽƚƐŽŶ ?Ɛown definition of 
sincerity is instructive in helping us understand what Addison and Steele seek to imbue 
Spectatorial politeness with: 
(2) Of Sincerity as it regards Men; and so it signifies a Simplicity of Mind and Manners in 
 our Conversation, and Carriage one towards another; Singleness of Heart, 
 discovering it self in a constant Plainness and honest Openness of Behaviour, free 
 from all insidious Devices, and little Tricks, and Fetches of Craft and Cunning; from all 
 false Appearances and deceitful Disguises of ourselves in Word or Action; or yet 
 more plainly, it is to speak as we think, and do what we pretend and profess to 
 perform and make good what we promise, and in a Word, really to be, what we 
 would seem and appear to be. (Tillotson 1694: 15)  
For Tillotson, sincerity consists of transparency of speech and behaviour. His lexicon of 
ƐŝŶĐĞƌŝƚǇŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐ “ƐŝŵƉůŝĐŝƚǇ ? ? “ƐŝŶŐůĞŶĞƐƐ ? ? “ĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚƉůĂŝŶŶĞƐƐ ?ĂŶĚ “ŚŽŶĞƐƚŽƉĞŶŶĞƐƐ ?. Its 
ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶĞŶƚĂŝůƐƐƉĞĂŬŝŶŐŽŶĞ ?ƐŵŝŶĚ ? “ƐƉĞĂŬǁŚĂƚǁĞƚŚŝŶŬ ?) ĂŶĚďĞŝŶŐƚƌƵĞƚŽŽŶĞ ?Ɛ
ǁŽƌĚ ? “do what we pretend and profess to perforŵĂŶĚŵĂŬĞŐŽŽĚǁŚĂƚǁĞƉƌŽŵŝƐĞ ?). He 
argues that sincerity consists of oŶĞ ?Ɛbeing ĂŶĚŽŶĞ ?ƐƐĞĞŵŝŶŐďĞŝŶŐŝĚĞŶƚŝĐĂů ? “really to be, 
what we would seem and appeaƌƚŽďĞ ?).  In order to emphasise the oneness of being and 
seeming though, Tillotson has to use the vocabulary of dissimulation. Accordingly, he warns 
against the use ŽĨ “ŝŶƐŝĚŝŽƵƐĚĞǀŝĐĞƐ ? ? “dƌŝĐŬƐ ? ? “&ĞƚĐŚĞƐŽĨƌĂĨƚĂŶĚƵŶŶŝŶŐ ? ? “ĨĂůƐĞ
ĂƉƉĞĂƌĂŶĐĞƐ ? and  “deceitful Disguises ? (not being what one appears to be). Indeed, then he 
uses the language of simulation to specify what sincere speaking and doing entails, namely, 
doiŶŐǁŚĂƚ “ǁĞƉƌĞƚĞŶĚĂŶĚƉƌŽĨĞƐƐ ? ?ďĞŝŶŐƚƌƵĞƚŽǁŚĂƚǁĞ “ƉƌŽŵŝƐĞ ?, truly being what 
 “wĞǁŽƵůĚƐĞĞŵĂŶĚĂƉƉĞĂƌƚŽďĞ ?.  Implicit in this disquisition is the place of the 
ŝŶƚĞƌůŽĐƵƚŽƌ ?ŝŶďĞŝŶŐƉůĂŝŶ ?ƚƌĂŶƐƉĂƌĞŶƚ ?ŚŽŶĞƐƚĂŶĚŽƉĞŶƚŽŽŶĞ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌůŽĐƵƚŽƌ ?ŽŶe is 
necessarily plain, honest and true to oneself.  Tillotson thus argues that sincerity is the 
identity of feeling with its avowal.   
                                                                                                                                                       
 ‘ŽďƐĞƌǀĂŶĐĞŽƌĨƵůĨŝůŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐĂŶĚĨŽƌŵƐŽĨĐŽƵƌƚĞƐǇ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐĂĚŽƉƚĞĚŝŶ/ƚĂůŝĂŶŝŶƚŚĞ
form compliment, and thence passed into French and English. Compliment is thus a doublet of COMPLEMENT n. (the form 
directly < Latin). The latter was in use in this sense about a century before the introduction of the French word, which 
slowly took its place between 1655 and 1715 ? ?OED 2015). 
3
 ³The World is grown so full of Dissimulation and Compliment, that Mens Words are hardly any Signification of their 
Thoughts; and if any Man measure his words by his Heart, and speak as he thinks, and do not express more Kindness to 
every Man, than Men usually have for any Man, he can hardly escape the Censure of want of Breeding. The old English 
Plainness and Sincerity, that generous Integrity of Nature, and Honesty of Disposition, which always argues true Greatness 
ŽĨDŝŶĚ ?ĂŶĚŝƐƵƐƵĂůůǇĂĐĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ĚǁŝƚŚƵŶĚĂƵŶƚĞĚŽƵƌĂŐĞĂŶĚZĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƐŝŶĂŐƌĞĂƚŵĞĂƐƵƌĞůŽƐƚĂŵŽŶŐƐƚƵƐ ?
(Spectator 103, Thursday June 28, 1711).  
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 TŚĞĂĐŚŝĞǀĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƐŝŶĐĞƌŝƚǇŝŶ “ConversatiŽŶĂŶĚĂƌƌŝĂŐĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ? is no 
easy feat. /ŶĚĞĞĚ ?ǁŚĂƚĚŽĞƐŽŶĞĚŽŝĨŽŶĞ ?ƐƚƌƵĞĨĞĞůŝŶŐƐ ?ŝĨŐŝǀĞŶǀŽŝĐĞ ?ĂƌĞlikely to harm 
ŽŶĞ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌůŽĐƵƚŽƌ ?dŝůůŽƚƐŽŶĂŶƚŝĐŝpates this problem and counsels,  “[n]ot that we are 
obliged to ƚĞůůĞǀĞƌǇDĂŶŽƵƌDŝŶĚ ?. Indeed,  “[w]e may be silent, and conceal as much of 
ourselves, as Prudence or any other good Reason requires; but we must not put on a 
Disguise, and make a false Appearance and empty Show of what we are not, either by Word 
or by Action ? (Tillotson 1694: 15).  He gŽĞƐŽŶƚŽĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞǁŚĂƚŝƐ “contrary to this 
Virtue ?, namely,  “that Complement, which is current in Conversation, and which is for the 
most Part nothing but Words, to fill up the Gaps, and supply the empty Discourse; and a 
Pretence to that Kindness and Esteem for Persons, which either in Truth we have not, or not 
to that degree which our Expressions seem to ĞǆŚŽƌƚ ? (Tillotson 1694: 15). Tillotson uses the 
antecedent form ŽĨ “ĐŽŵƉůŝŵĞŶƚ ?, namely  “ĐŽŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚ ? (< Latin), to label the routine 
expression of a greater regard for an interlocutor than the speaker holds. He also uses the 
ŶŽƵŶ “ƉƌĞƚĞŶĐĞ ? ?ŶŽƚŝŶƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞŽĨ “asserƚŝŽŶ ? (as earlier) but instead in the sense of 
 “ĨĂůƐĞƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶ ? (OED  ? ? ? ? P “pretence ? n. 5). So Tillotson provides Steele with the ballast 
to explore what happens to conversation in the absence of sincerity and his counsel 
arguably informs the construction of Spectatorial politeness. 
 Indeed, the Spectator does appear to shed light onto the ways in which polite 
behaviour, particularly as it was reflected in conversation, might be cast negatively (as 
insincere, flattery and artificial) or as positively (as sincere, easy, friendly, accommodating 
and true).  If Addison and Steele treat politeness as a system for the conduct of sociable 
ĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝŽŶĂŵŽŶŐĞƋƵĂůƐ ?ĂŶĚǁŚĂƚ ?ƐŵŽƌĞ ?ĂƐĂƐǇƐƚĞŵƚŚĂ ĐĂŶďĞůĞĂƌŶĞĚĂŶĚ
practised, they also identify the misuse or abuse of its features. For instance, Addison 
counts as a critical attribute of sociable conversation,  “Good-ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ?, namely,  “ƚŚĂƚ
ŝƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨDŝŶĚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ “gives a certain Air to the Countenance which is more amiable 
ƚŚĂŶĞĂƵƚǇ ? ? “shows Virtue in the fairest >ŝŐŚƚ ? ?ĂŶĚ “makes even Folly and Impertinence 
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĂďůĞ ?: 
  
(3)  There is no Society or Conversation to be kept up in the World without Good-nature, 
 or something which must bear its Appearance, and supply its Place. For this Reason 
 Mankind have been forced to invent a kind of Artificial Humanity, which is what we 
 express by the Word Good-Breeding. For if we examine thoroughly the Idea of what 
 we call so, we shall find it to be nothing else but an Imitation and Mimickry of Good-
 nature, or in other Terms, Affability, Complaisance and Easiness of Temper reduced 
 into an Art. (Spectator No. 169. Thursday, Sept. 13, 1711) 
 
Addison implicitly invokes sincerity as a criterion for distinguishing between genuine good 
nature (a quality which all people have the opportunity to be born with) and the mere 
appearance of it, which he labels  “good breeding ?.  “ƌĞĞĚŝŶŐ ? is construed in the period as 
 “the results of training as shown in personal manners and behaviour ? (OED online: 
 “breeding ?n. 4. 1888). Thus, although the presence of good nature is ideal for sociable 
conversation, it is not critical. In its absence, Addison asserts, true humanity is replaced by 
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 “ƌƚ ?: behaviour that is an approximation or the affectation of good nature. If Spectatorial 
politeness consists of  “Affability, Complaisance and Easinesse ŽĨdĞŵƉĞƌ ?, then it is true 
politeness, marked by the identification of feeling with its avowal. Thus, Spectatorial 
 ‘ƉŽůŝƚĞŶĞƐƐ ? is positive and sincere. However, in the hands of people marked by  “a kind of 
ĂƌƚŝĨŝĐŝĂů,ƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĐŽŶƐŝƐƚƐŽĨ ‘/ŵŝƚĂƚŝŽn and DŝŵŝĐŬƌǇ ?,  “ƉŽůŝƚĞŶĞƐƐ ? can be only the 
affectation or pretence of [true] politeness.  
 The Spectator ?ƐŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƐĂďŽƵƚƐŝŶĐĞƌŝƚǇĂŶĚĂƌƚŝĨŝĐĞƌĞĨůĞĐƚƚŚĞ constant 
juxtaposition of different interpretations ĂŶĚĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ “ƉŽůŝƚĞŶĞƐƐ ? in the social 
sphere.  The persistent collocation of the keywords (complaisance, compliment, civility) in 
various contexts, often with new ones (for example, good breeding, good nature, ease) 
invites different evaluations of the brand of politeness discussed. Both Steele and Addison 
in their Spectator pieces distinguish between politeness and behaviour that is artificial, 
insincere.  The literature of the whole century illuminates the ways in which speakers 
struggle with the fundamental tension between being true to oneself and avoiding falseness 
to others. dŝůůŽƚƐŽŶ ?Ɛdefinitive statement on sincerity is never far away from this debate as 
his sermon is repeatedly reprinted throughout the century, often as a didactic piece 
collected with other texts for the edification of the young.4   
 
3. Mid-eighteenth century politeness: sincerity, hypocrisy, considerateness, selfishness 
By the middle of the century, a number of different meanings of politeness co-exist in the 
universe of English printed discourse. However, the structure of its polysemy is contingent 
on the stance, identity, gender and social rank of the recipient.  In this section, I examine the 
consequences for the polysemy of politeness of the idea that insincerity is a precondition for 
showing consideration for others, a key function of politeness. Further, politeness was 
understood to be of benefit or harm, depending upon the position and power of the 
recipient.  So mid-eighteenth-century conversations examine whether politeness is less 
about concern for others than the concern to be thought well of by others, within a 
particularly artificial, social milieu. 
 The World, a mid-century periodical in the tradition of the Spectator, illustrates the 
nexus of different interpretations of politeness. Edward Moore, using the eidolon of Adam 
Fitz-Adam, edited this weekly periodical, which included contributors like Lord Chesterfield, 
Soame Jenyns and Horace Walpole.  Like the Spectator, The World offers instruction as well 
as entertainment for its readership, the metropolitan middling sorts. Recalling the 
Spectator ?ƐĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ “ŐŽŽĚ-ďƌĞĞĚŝŶŐ ?ĂƐ “ƌƚŝĨŝĐŝĂů,ƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ?, The World goes 
further, declaring that ƉŽůŝƚĞŶĞƐƐŝƐ “the art of reducing vice to a system that does not shock 
ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?:  
(4) It is not virtue that constitutes the politeness of a nation, but the art of reducing vice
  to a system that does not shock society. POLITENESS (as I understand the word) is an  
                                                 
4
 A late eighteenth century example is the fourth edition of an anthology of excerpts from influential texts, including 
Tillotson, Addison and Chesterfield. Anonymous (1785).   
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 universal desire of pleasing others (that are not too much below one) in trifles, for a 
 ůŝƚƚůĞƚŝŵĞ ?ĂŶĚŽĨŵĂŬŝŶŐŽŶĞ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌĐŽƵƌƐĞǁŝƚŚƚĞŵĂŐƌĞĞĂďůĞƚŽďŽƚŚƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ďǇ
 civility without ceremony, by ease without brutality, by complaisance without 
 flattery, by acquiescence without sincerity. (The World, No 103, p. 266. 1766) 
 
 Adam Fitz-ĚĂŵ ?Ɛ definition identifies as target qualities of this system the familiar 
cultural keywords, civility, ease and complaisance, as well as a new quality, acquiescence. 
These are contrasted with qualities that are presumably considered less desirable in 
achieving agreeable intercourse, namely, ceremony, brutality, flattery and, apparently 
incongruously, sincerity. However, in light of the very limited nature of The World ?Ɛvariety 
of politeness, the order of the juxtaposition of acquiescence with sincerity makes sense, 
given the implication that to acquiesce is to accept a state of affairs that may or may not be 
desirable.5  If the goal is to smooth the experience of a temporary interaction over trivial 
matters, then the ƐƚƌƵŐŐůĞŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚŝŶĂǀŽŝĚŝŶŐ “being false to any man through being true 
ƚŽŽŶĞ ?ƐŽǁŶƐĞůĨ ?is itself to be avoided in favour of acquiescence (Trilling 1972: 5). Adam 
Fitz-Adam helpfully construes his notion of politeness as fashion or modishness with the 
help of particular examples of behaviour: 
 
(5) A clergyman who puts his patron into a sweat by driving him around the room, till he 
 has found the coolest place for him, is not polite. When Bubbamira changes her 
 handkerchief before you, and wipes her neck, rather than leave you alone while she 
 should perform the refreshing office in the next room, I should think she is not 
 polite. When Boncoeur shivers on your dreary hill where for twenty years you have 
 been vainly endeavouring to raise reluctant plantations, and yet professes that only 
 some of the trees have been a little kept back by the late dry season; he is not polite; 
 he is more; he is kind. When Sophia is really pleased with the stench of a kennel, 
 because her husband likes that she should go and look at a favourite litter; she must 
 not pretend to politeness; she is only a good wife.  (The World, No 103, p. 266. 1766) 
 
 Foregrounded in dŚĞtŽƌůĚ ?s piece is the matter of making interaction pleasant for 
the interlocutor and easy for oneself.  Accordingly, tŚĞĐůĞƌŐǇŵĂŶǁŚŽ “puts his patron into 
a sweat by driving him around the room till he has found the coolest place for him, is not 
ƉŽůŝƚĞ ?, because his zeal  ? “ďƌƵƚĂůŝƚǇ ?) results in discomfort rather than ease for his 
companion. And the girl who attends to her personal appearance in company shows more 
concern for the ĐĞƌĞŵŽŶǇŽĨƚŚĞ “ƌĞĨƌĞƐŚŝŶŐŽĨĨŝĐĞ ? than for the sensibilities of her 
companions. These actions are, in The World ?ƐƚĞƌŵƐ ?ŶŽƚƉŽůŝƚĞďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞǇĨĂŝůƚŽŵĞĞƚ
the conditions of having  “ĞĂƐĞǁŝƚŚŽƵƚďƌƵƚĂůŝƚǇ ?Žƌ “ĐŝǀŝůŝƚǇǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĐĞƌĞŵŽŶǇ ?. The lack of 
politeness here is based on selfish notions of what is admissible in company. However, there 
is a different sort of lack of politeness, a variety that is positively viewed because it is 
ŵŽƚŝǀĂƚĞĚŵŽƌĞďǇĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĨŽƌŵĂŬŝŶŐŽŶĞ ?Ɛown life easy. So 
when  “ŽŶĐŽĞƵƌ ?, with a white lie, acknowledges the enormous effort expended on a 
                                                 
5
 Note that the OED online gives the following definition of acquiescence (n ? ?Ă ? “passive assent to, compliance with, 
acceƉƚĂŶĐĞŽĨƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐƵŶĚĞƐŝƌĂďůĞ ?. 
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project that has yielded scant results ? “he is not ƉŽůŝƚĞ ?ŚĞŝƐŵŽƌĞ ?ŚĞŝƐŬŝŶĚ ?. And when a 
woman appears to take ĂŶŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŚĞƌŚƵƐďĂŶĚ ?ƐĚŽŐƐƌĞŐĂƌĚůĞƐƐof her own fine 
feelings,  “she must not pretend to politeness; she is only ĂŐŽŽĚǁŝĨĞ ?. These last two 
ĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐĂƌĞŵĂƌŬĞĚďǇĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌƚŚĞĨĞĞůŝŶŐƐŽĨƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌĂƚƚŚĞĞǆƉĞŶƐĞŽĨŽŶĞ ?Ɛ
own comfort ĂŶĚĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ?ĂƚƚŚĞĞǆƉĞŶƐĞŽĨŽŶĞ ?ƐďĞŝŶŐƚƌƵĞƚŽŽŶĞƐĞůĨ. SƵďŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŶŐŽŶĞ ?s 
own ease and comfort ƚŽĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐĨĞĞůŝŶŐƐtakes judgment and subtlety. Adam Fitz-ĚĂŵ ?Ɛ
examples illustrate the extent to which insincerity, indeed, hypocrisy, is crucial in succeeding 
in showing consideration for others.  Clearly mid-eighteenth-century conversation about 
politeness questions ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ “politeness can be protected from contamination by its close 
ĂŶĂůŽŐƵĞĚŝƐƐŝŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ĂǀŝĚƐŽŶ 2004: 46).  Thus Fitz-Adam slyly includes the absence of 
sincerity in his definition of politeness, and it is this feature that increasingly marks the 
hostile reception and negative interpretation of politeness for the middling sorts in the 
middle of the century.6  
 Evidence for the public apprehension and construction of politeness as a mode of 
fashionable behaviour that is artificial and insincere as well as selfish and egotistical is its 
treatment in the fiction of the period. Increasingly, writers engage with questions about 
 “woŵĞŶ ?ƉŽůŝƚĞŶĞƐƐĂŶĚŝŶƐŝŶĐĞƌŝƚǇ ? ?ĂǀŝĚƐŽŶ 2004: 46). DĂƌǇŽůůǇĞƌ ?ƐĞƉŝƐƚŽůĂƌǇŶŽǀĞů ?
Felicia to Charlotte (2 vols., 1744-49) is concerned with the difficult navigation of courtship 
and marriage in the hinterlands ŽĨŵĞƚƌŽƉŽůŝƚĂŶƉŽůŝƚĞƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?&ĞůŝĐŝĂ ?ƐůĞƚƚĞƌƐcontain 
extended discussions about the nature of reason and judgement, pleasure and passion and 
virtue and vice in the happiness of mankind.7  &ĞůŝĐŝĂ ?ƐŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚand tŚĞŶŽǀĞů ?ƐŚĞƌŽ ?
Lucius, is a man of feeling as well as reason. Collyer gives Lucius the task of arguing 
ZŽƵƐƐĞĂƵ ?ƐƚŚĞƐŝƐƚŚĂƚ “virtue reŝŐŶƐŵŽƌĞƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůůǇƚŚĂŶǀŝĐĞ ? (99), and that it is possible 
to see this most clearly by considering  “the vices and virtues of all ƚŚĞŬŶŽǁŶǁŽƌůĚ ?, 
inclƵĚŝŶŐ “ǁŝůĚƵŶĐƵůƚŝǀĂƚĞĚŶĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?. He avers: 
 
(6)  [t]he moral sense, Madam, is a taste for what is amiable; that distinguishing faculty 
 of the mind which makes us feel, ----sensibly and strongly feel, ---the harmony and 
 discord of actions. It is the touch, the ear of the soul; while reason is the eye to 
 regulate the exertions of this sympathetic faculty. The moral sense feels 
 instantaneously without waiting for the slow deliberation of the rational powers, to 
 know if it ought to do so: while reason is given us to reign supreme, to examine the 
 fitness of the object by which we are intendered, and to regulate in what manner we 
 must exert our benevolent offices, so as best to render our endeavours subservient 
to the general good and happiness (Collyer, 1744: 101)  
 
Thus Collyer gives voice to sensibility, an increasingly important notion that places feeling, 
ĂŶĚƚŚĞŝŶƚĞŶƐŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĂƚĨĞĞůŝŶŐ ?ĂƚƚŚĞĐĞŶƚƌĞŽĨŽŶĞ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ĞǀĞŶƚƐĂŶĚ
                                                 
6
  Nevalainen & Tissari (2 ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?ŽďƐĞƌǀĞƚŚĂƚ “politeness does ŶŽƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇĞƋƵĂůƐŝŶĐĞƌŝƚǇ ?, as evidenced 
in a letter from Bishop Hurd in 1742, ǁŚĞƌĞŚĞĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞƐŝŶƐŝŶĐĞƌŝƚǇǁŝƚŚĂĐŽƵƌƚŝĞƌ ?ƐƉŽůŝƚĞŶĞƐƐ ? They also 
ƋƵŽƚĞdƌƵƐůĞƌ ?ƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶĂƌǇŝŶƚŚŝƐƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ?^ĞĞďĞůŽǁ ?ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? ? ? 
7   Collyer was foremost a translator. She published The Virtuous Orphan ?ĂƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨDĂƌŝǀĂƵǆ ?ƐLa Vie de 
Marianne in instalments in the London Evening Post in 1742.  
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things. In her novel, Lucius and Felicia represent the best hearts and minds and are the 
touch-stones of feeling and reason: sensibility. When Felicia congratulates her friend 
Charlotte on her ŵĂƚĐŚǁŝƚŚ “ƚŚĞŐĂǇ ?ƚŚĞƚĞŶĚĞƌWŚŝůĂƌŝŽ ?, willing her to be happy, she uses 
the opportunity to offer a disquisition on the want of sincerity in politeness, thus: 
 
(7)  You see, Madam, what an aukward creature I would have you. To dare to be happy 
 is a thing so unfashionable, that it may possibly require some degree of resolution to 
 withstand the shock of being thought that dull thing called a fond wife; but however 
 unpolite it is to have any degree of affection subsist between those who ought to 
 have the greatest, you have too much good sense to be ashamed of what must now 
 not only be the essence of your happiness, but your highest glory.    
       How strange is it, that a name, a mere sound, and a sound too to which we have no 
 settled meaning, should have such an influence upon mankind, as to make them 
 cancel all the engagements of duty, affection, and happiness; and even forfeit their 
 hopes of a blissful futurity! what bewitching charm! what dire spell! what strange 
 enchantment is contained in the word polite, that it should control our very 
 passions, and make us suffer greater pangs of self-denial to become vicious, than 
 would be sufficient to raise us to the highest attainments of heroic virtue!  
 
&ĞůŝĐŝĂ ?ƐƌƵŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶƐŽŶƚŚĞŚŝŐŚůǇƵŶĨĂƐŚŝŽŶĂďůĞƐƚĂƚĞŽĨŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇŚĂƉƉǇŵĂƌƌŝĂŐĞchime 
with The World ?ƐŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚĂ “ŐŽŽĚǁŝĨĞ ? should not try to be polite. Felicia spends 
some time marveling at the magical effĞĐƚŽŶƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐďĞƚƚĞƌŶĂƚƵƌĞƐ ? “duty, affection, and 
ŚĂƉƉŝŶĞƐƐ ? ?ŽĨ “ƉŽůŝƚĞ ?. Indeed, the primary sense of polite ĨŽƌŽůůǇĞƌ ?ƐŚĞƌŽŝŶĞŝƐŵĂƌŬĞĚ ?
not by the concern for others, but the concern to be thought well of by others, within a 
particularly artificial, social milieu.  Felicia goes so far as to assert that seeking to acquire the 
appearance of politeness involves denying ŽŶĞ ?ƐŽǁŶƚƌƵĞ(better) feelings (sensibility) in 
favour of the artifice and vice of fashion and offers examples to illustrate the extent of the 
vicious enchantment in politeness: 
 
(8)  To be thought polite, how many ladies affect vices they have not the least inclination 
 for, and are contented to be fashionably miserable? To be thought polite, an old fop, 
 decrepid with years, will keep a mistress, and have the insolence to boast of a 
 thousand vices, which his years, one would think, exempted him from. To be thought 
 polite, a man will contemn the too condescending affection of the stupid fool his 
 wife, despise her easy virtue, and at the same time adore an impudent prostitute, 
 who tyrannizes over him, and insults him with impunity. While a lady for the same 
 reason (out of politeness) will abhor the nauseous fond wretch her husband. Thus a 
 confused notion of honour (another word of the same kind, the letters of which I 
 suppose are a kind of talisman) will make a coward go trembling to destruction and 
 rush with horror into a dreaded eternity.  Letter XIII (Collyer, 1744: 143)  
 
What ŝƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚŽůůǇĞƌ ?Ɛmoralizing reflection on fashionable politeness is the 
presupposition that for politeness to be noticed, people must demonstrate modes of 
behaviour and practices that are highly marked, unusual and uncharacteristic of them on 
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the one hand, and uncharacteristically vicious on the other. Her examples highlight the 
perception that politeness is associated with forms of behaviour that are beneficial to 
nobody; not to the people wŚŽ “ǁŽƵůĚďĞƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƉŽůŝƚĞ ?, and not to the people they 
affect. The subjects themselves do not even incline to the actions they undertake; what 
drives them is the desire to appear polite to others.  It is thus, pressure to perform on a 
public stage before others who observe and in observing, pass judgement.  Collyer thus 
allows the inference that if politeness is an attribute of particular people from a certain 
milieu, then the procedure for identifying with and imitating those people consists of taking 
on their habits and predilections, which include immoral and vicious practices. She also 
allows the inference that the particular brand of viciousness consists of sexual dalliances for 
ǁŽŵĞŶĂŶĚ ‘ŐĂůůĂŶƚƌǇ ?ĨŽƌŵĞŶ ? ŽůůǇĞƌ ?ƐƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚŽĨĨĂƐŚŝŽŶĂďůĞƉŽůŝƚĞŶĞƐƐŝůůƵŵŝŶĂƚĞƐƚŚĞ
negative valence that the term gathers ?ƐŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚ “politeness is a 
euphemism for something more insidious: politeness means tact, and tact equals lying; 
politeness means gallantrǇĂŶĚŐĂůůĂŶƚƌǇĞƋƵĂůƐĂĚƵůƚĞƌǇ ? ?ĂǀŝĚƐŽŶ 2004: 47).  
 These pieces of evidence from the middle of the century demonstrate the ways in 
which the contexts and collocations in which polite and politeness occur widen to include 
readers who are predisposed to interpret the expressions as opprobrious in reference and 
connotation. For The World and its readers, politeness connotes the facile management of 
agreeable interaction in superficial and trivial matters. For Collyer, politeness connotes the 
absence of virtue and sincerity in the ordinary relationships that are fundamental to 
happiness. Both elaborate these meanings through illustrative examples which instruct the 
reader in interpretation. Thus the middling sorts that make up the mid-century reading 
public are primed to interpret polite ĂƐĂǀĂƌŝĞƚǇŽĨ “ŐŽŽĚ-ďƌĞĞĚŝŶŐ ? associated with upper-
class manners, a variety that is anathema to the virtues of sincerity and consideration. 
 Now around the same time that Mary Collyer was giving the horrors of politeness 
fictional treatment, Philip Dormer Stanhope, the fourth earl of Chesterfield, was writing to 
his illegitimate son, Philip, to instruct him in the acquisition of the social graces. The letters 
reflect an aristocratic perspective on the utility of the components of a refined and polished 
ĨŝŐƵƌĞ ?WŽůŝƚĞŶĞƐƐ ?Žƌ ‘ŐŽŽĚ-ďƌĞĞĚŝŶŐ ?ŝŶŚĞƐƚĞƌĨŝĞůĚ ?ƐůĞǆŝĐŽŶ ?is cast as an inventory of 
formal civilities, consisting of linguistic features including forms of address, a preferred 
lexicon, a preferred manner of speaking that all need to be adjusted and nuanced 
depending upon the interlocutor. In consequence, the letters indicate a markedly 
instrumental view of a set of manners that can be enumerated, defined, taught to 
somebody and applied to any situation. For example, on the conduct of conversation, 
Chesterfield writes,  
 
(9) I need not (I believe) advise you to adapt your conversation to the people you are 
 conversing with: for I suppose you would not, without this caution, have talked upon 
 the same subject, and in the same manner, to a minister of state, a bishop, a 
 philosopher, a captain, and a woman. A man of the world must, like the chameleon, 
 be able to take every different hue; which is by no means a criminal or abject, but a 
13 
 
 necessary complaisance; for it relates only to manner and not to morals.  (Letter LIV; 
 Bath, October 19, 1748). 
 
His advice seems to be perfectly reasonable: he implies that it is natural and appropriate to 
accommodate ŽŶĞ ?ƐĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝŽŶto the status and identity of ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ interlocutor, whether a 
ďŝƐŚŽƉŽƌĂǁŽŵĂŶ ?ŚĞƐƚĞƌĨŝĞůĚ ?Ɛuse of the chameleon, a creature that assumes the hue of 
the objects that it touches, is an apt illumination of his point as it implies that such 
adaptation and accommodation is quite natural. So carrying out this work involves 
complaisance: paying more attention to the expectations and desires of the interlocutor 
ƚŚĂŶƚŽŽŶĞ ?ƐŽǁŶƚƌƵĞĂƚƚŝtudes and feelings. For Chesterfield, accommodation is a matter 
of form (manners) rather than of substance (morals).  Strikingly, ŚĞƐƚĞƌĨŝĞůĚ ?ƐůŝƐƚŽĨ
conversationalists iƐĂƐŽĐŝĂůŚŝĞƌĂƌĐŚǇĚĞĨŝŶĞĚďǇƚŚĞƐƉĞĂŬĞƌƐ ?ŽĨĨŝĐĞs and ranks; from the 
ŚŝŐŚĞƐƚ ? “ŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌŽĨƐƚĂƚĞ ? ?ƚŽƚŚĞůŽǁĞƐƚ ? “ĐĂƉƚĂŝŶ ?). He reserves for his last example, a 
woman, a creature that is altogether different from the others. Chesterfield ?ƐůĞƚƚĞƌƐƚŽŚŝƐ
son include a great deal of instruction on how to treat women and how to seek women ?Ɛ
instruction. As for conversing with them, he says: 
 
(10)  Your conversation with women should always be respectful; but, at the same time, 
 enjoué, and always addressed to their vanity. Everything you say or do should 
 convince them of the regard you have (whether you have it or not) for their beauty, 
 their wit, or their merit. Men have possibly as much vanity as women, though of 
 another kind; and both art and good-breeding require, that, instead of mortifying, 
 you should please and flatter it, by words and looks of approbation. (Letter XC, 1749) 
 
By advising ƚŚĂƚŽŶĞĂĐĐŽŵŵŽĚĂƚĞƚŽŽŶĞ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌůŽĐƵƚŽƌ ?ŚĞƌĞŶĚĞƌƐƐŝŶĐĞƌŝƚǇƌĞĚƵŶĚĂŶƚŽƌ
irrelevant. In this extract (10) ?ŚĞĂĚǀŝƐĞƐƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐǀĂŶŝƚǇ ?ďƵƚŵŽƌĞ ?
he urges his pupil to persuade his addressee of his regard for their beauty and wit, or 
(presumably if it is not feasible to do this) their merit. It is in this injunction to please and 
flatter the vanity of women (and men) that Chesterfield makes clear the distinction between 
 ‘ĂƌƚĂŶĚŐŽŽĚ-ďƌĞĞĚŝŶŐ ?and sincerity. In the same letter, he discusses the importance of the 
ƐƚǇůĞĂĚŽƉƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƌŬŽĨĞŶŐĂŐŝŶŐŽŶĞ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌůŽĐƵƚŽƌƐ P 
(11)  Upon my word, I do not say too much, when I say that superior good-breeding, 
 insinuating manners, and genteel address, are half your business. Your knowledge 
 will have but little influence upon the mind, if your manners prejudice the heart 
 against you; but, on the other hand, how easily will you DUPE the understanding, 
 where you have first engaged the heart? And hearts are by no means to be gained 
 by that mere common civility which everybody practices. Bowing again to those who 
 bow to you, answering dryly those who speak to you, and saying nothing offensive to 
 anybody, is such negative good-breeding that it is only not being a brute; as it would 
 ďĞďƵƚĂǀĞƌǇƉŽŽƌĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂŶǇŵĂŶ ?ƐĐůĞĂŶůŝŶĞƐƐƚŽƐĂǇŚĞĚŝĚŶŽƚƐƚŝŶŬ ?/ƚ
 is an active, cheerful, officious, seducing, good-breeding that must gain you the 
 good-will and first sentiments of men, and the affections of the women. (Letter XC. 
 1748/9) 
 
14 
 
 He argues that going through the motions, bowing when being bowed to, speaking 
ŽŶůǇǁŚĞŶƐƉŽŬĞŶƚŽ ? “saying nothing offensive to ĂŶǇďŽĚǇ ?, in short,  “ĐŽŵŵŽŶĐŝǀŝůŝƚǇ ?
ĂŵŽƵŶƚƐƚŽ “ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞŐŽŽĚ-ďƌĞĞĚŝŶŐ ?. This is not the absence of manners but the 
perfunctory performance of routine gestures and rules for the interaction with others. He 
ĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽ “ĚƵƉĞ ?ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ “undersƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ? ?ŝƚŝƐĨŝƌƐƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƚŽ “ĞŶŐĂŐĞ
ƚŚĞŝƌŚĞĂƌƚƐ ?. This reqƵŝƌĞƐƚŚĞƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ ?ĂĐƚŝǀĞĂŶĚ “ƐĞĚƵĐŝŶŐ ? practice of manners that 
distinguishes and sets apart the seducer from everybody else. The keyword encountered 
here in the context ŽĨ “ƉŽůŝƚĞŶĞƐƐ ?, namely, civility, is rendered empty and superficial as it is 
presented as common, as ordinary. He implies that to make oŶĞ ?ƐƉŽůŝƚĞŶĞƐƐĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞĂŶĚ
beneficial to oneself takes talent, effort, and self-consciousness.  The positive value 
Chesterfield gives to the performance of respectful, persuasive and flattering conversation 
in the wider discourse context of the period makes his views susceptible to disapproval by 
those who rate sincerity more highly than agreeable interaction.  Indeed, his notion of 
ƉŽůŝƚĞŶĞƐƐĐŽŶƐŝƐƚƐƉƌĞĐŝƐĞůǇŽĨǁŚĂƚdŝůůŽƚƐŽŶĂďŚŽƌƐ ?ŶĂŵĞůǇƚŚĞĐůĞĂƌĚŝƐƚĂŶĐŝŶŐŽĨŽŶĞ ?Ɛ
ǁŽƌĚƐĂŶĚĚĞŵĞĂŶŽƵƌĨƌŽŵŽŶĞ ?Ɛ heart.  The extent to which attention to ŚĞƐƚĞƌĨŝĞůĚ ?Ɛ
particular construction of politeness seems prevalent in the discourse of the mid eighteenth 
century is evidenced by the fact that writers like Mary Collyer and periodicals like The World 
and The Connoisseur devote considerable effort and paper to the discussion of politeness as 
vice.  
 The structure of the polysemy of politeness in the middle of the century is 
contingent on the stance, identity, gender and social rank of the recipient.  In other words, 
ĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?Ɛsocial rank and position and personal attributes (e.g. gender, social rank, age, 
and attitudes and ideology) prime the individual for a preferred or primary interpretation of 
politeness.  In particular, politeness is understood to be of benefit or harm, depending upon 
the position and power of the recipient. For example, for the middle-aged aristocrat and 
grandee, Chesterfield (and his pupil son), the primary set of senses is social: it has to do with 
the acquisition and practice of aristocratic refined manners in speech, comportment and 
ĂƉƉĞĂƌĂŶĐĞƚŽƐŚŽǁŽŶĞ ?ƐďĞƐƚƐŝĚĞŝŶĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?In contrast for the working 
woman novelist, Mary Collyer, the primary associations of politeness consist of artifice and 
pretence in pursuit of fashionable narcissism at the expense of sincerity, sensibility and 
honesty. For Adam Fitz-Adam and The World, the polysemy of politeness allows the 
consideration of degrees of sincerity and degrees of artifice in the achievement of agreeable 
interaction among different types. This consideration includes aspects of Spectatorial 
sociable politeness as ǁĞůůĂƐďŽƚŚƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞĂŶĚŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨŚĞƐƚĞƌĨŝĞůĚ ?ƐĞŐŽƚŝƐƚŝĐĂů
politeness.  Thus the middle of the eighteenth century witnesses the co-existence of 
multiple senses of politeness ? polysemy ? in the discourse universe. Importantly, not all 
speakers share or access all of its senses equally. Because ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ? particular social, 
personal and affective circumstances are key in shaping their understanding and 
interpretation, some senses and connotations within the polysemy of politeness are more 
prominent than others. 
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4. Chesterfield and the codification of politeness as etiquette and good manners 
 The publication of ŚĞƐƚĞƌĨŝĞůĚ ?Ɛ letters in 1774 by PŚŝůŝƉ ?ƐǁŝĚŽǁ ?Eugenia Stanhope, 
effectively codified the peculiarly aristocratic brand of politeness that marked the mid-
century.  dŚĞůĞƚƚĞƌƐ ?ƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶcreated such a furore that it occasioned the coining of the 
term  “Chesterfieldism ? as  “shorthand for aristocratic delinquency ? in the period (Langford 
1991: 541).  Henry Hodgson used the term in an allegorical piece, The Analizer, about the 
ways in which envy and politeness overshadow virtue and goodness. DĞƌĐƵƌǇ ?:ŽǀĞ ?Ɛ
messenger, 
(12)  Finding at length his open efforts were vain, he had recourse to stratagem and of 
 several infernal ingredients, formed two seeds which, unknown to any of the 
 tutelary deities of mankind he sowed near the others, hoping to destroy their 
 effects. These seeds were envy and the whole circle of Chesterfieldism, the effectual 
 destroyers of our peace, and of that sincerity, and those virtues which seem to have 
 been designed for the strongest tyes of society, of friendship, and the fruitful source 
 of all that can felicitate human life. (Hodgson, 1778, np)  
 
In a footnote providing a gloss of the term ?,ŽĚŐƐŽŶŶŽƚĞƐ ? “in the original of this piece, 
ǁƌŝƚƚĞŶůŽŶŐďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŚĞƐƚĞƌĨŝĞůĚ ?ƐƉĞƌŶŝĐŝŽƵƐLetters, the seeds were Envy 
and Politeness ?. The fact that Hodgson decides to replace  “ƉŽůŝƚĞŶĞƐƐ ?ǁŝƚŚ “the whole 
Circle of ChesterfieldŝƐŵ ? underlines the ĞǆƚĞŶƚƚŽǁŚŝĐŚŚĞƐƚĞƌĨŝĞůĚ ?Ɛ “ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? had 
invaded ƚŚĞƐĞŵĂŶƚŝĐƐƉĂĐĞŽĨ “ƉŽůŝƚĞŶĞƐƐ ?.  It is instructive that Hodgson invokes 
 “ƐŝŶĐĞƌŝƚǇ ? ĂŶĚ “ǀŝƌƚƵĞ ? as the victims of ChesterfieldŝƐŵ ?ƌĞĐĂůůŝŶŐŽůůǇĞƌ ?ƐƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐŽŶ
the impact of the public understanding of fashionable politeness on what Hodgson 
characterizes as  “the strongest tyes of friĞŶĚƐŚŝƉ ? ?dŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŝƐƚŽǁŚĂƚĞǆƚĞŶƚ,ŽĚŐƐŽŶ ?Ɛ
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽŚĞƐƚĞƌĨŝĞůĚ ?ƐůĞƚƚĞƌƐŝƐŵŽƌĞǁŝĚĞƐƉƌĞĂĚ ? 
 In fact, the fiction of the period provides cogent evidence that ŚĞƐƚĞƌĨŝĞůĚ ?ƐďƌĂŶĚ
of politeness was received with dismay and disapproval. In 1777, Samuel Jackson Pratt, 
using the pseudonym, Courtney Melmoth, produced a satirical novel, The Pupil of Pleasure. 
The story of the seduction of Harriet, ĂŶŚŽŶĞƐƚĐƵƌĂƚĞ ?ƐǁŝĨĞ, by a cynical younger 
practitioner of Chesterfieldian maxims is set in Buxton, Ă “ƉůĂĐĞŽĨƉŽůŝƚĞŶĞƐƐ ? as an up-and-
coming spa town. Pratt lays out his approach in his preface after presenting a summary 
ĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨŚĞƐƚĞƌĨŝĞůĚ ?ƐďƌĂŶĚŽĨpoliteness (viii-ix):  
 
(13)  The essence of my Lord CHESTERFIELD ?S system seems to be neither more nor less than 
 this: Secure yourself from being blasted, as he terms it, and do whatever you think 
 proper: whatever fancy, passion, whim or wickedness, suggest, only command your 
 countenance, check your temper, and throw before your heart and bosom the shield 
 of Dissimulation, and snatch it ? seize it ? enjoy it. 
In regard to women ? never surely issued from the press a collection of hints so 
capable of being turned to their destruction: and the sex ought to be alarmed at 
their publication (which, however, one of their own sex has ushered into the world) 
than at anything that ever was pointed at their peace of mind, or purity of character. 
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 dŚĞŝŵƉůŝĐŝƚůǇŵĂůĞĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞĞŽĨWƌĂƚƚ ?ƐƉƌĞĨĂĐĞŝƐŽĨĨĞƌed a summary of 
ŚĞƐƚĞƌĨŝĞůĚ ?Ɛ “ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?, which consists principally of avoiding paying for the pursuit and 
ĞŶũŽǇŵĞŶƚŽĨŽŶĞ ?ƐĚĞƐŝƌĞƐďǇĞŶƐƵƌŝŶŐŽŶĞŝƐŝŶĐŽŶƚƌŽů ?WƌĂƚƚŝƐĨĂƌŵŽƌĞĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚĨŽƌthe 
wellbeing of ǁŽŵĞŶĂƐƚŚĞƚĂƌŐĞƚƐŽĨƐƵĐŚ “ƉĂƐƐŝŽŶ ?ǁŚŝŵŽƌǁŝĐŬĞĚŶĞƐƐ ?.  In the novel, 
WƌĂƚƚ ?ƐǀŝůůĂŝŶ ?WŚŝůŝƉ^ĞĚůĞǇ ?ƐƚƵĚŝĞƐŚĞƐƚĞƌĨŝĞůĚ ?ƐƉƌĞĐĞƉƚƐĂŶĚĂƉƉůŝĞƐƚŚĞŵĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚůǇĂŶĚ
diligently in his pursuit and subsequent ruin of Harriet.  The author asserts the morally 
blinding effect of upper-class refinement and artificiality.  What is self-ĐŽŶƚƌŽůĂŶĚ “ŬĞĞƉŝŶŐ
ƵƉĂƉƉĞĂƌĂŶĐĞƐ ? for some is regarded as dissimulation and deception by others.  
Accordingly, the meanings of politeness depend upon the rank, gender and social 
background of the speaker; to the upper-class man from town,  “ƉŽůŝƚĞ ? behaviour is aligned 
ǁŝƚŚŚĞƐƚĞƌĨŝĞůĚ ?ƐƉƌĞcepts and as it benefits him, is to be practised for his own advantage. 
In stark contrast, for the middle-class woman ?ƉŽƐƐŝďůǇĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƉƌŽǀŝŶĐĞƐ ? “ƉŽůŝƚĞ ?
behaviour is to be viewed with wariness and suspicion if it is applied to her with upper-class 
masculine manners. ŽŵƉĞůůŝŶŐ ?ŝĨƐƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐ ?ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌ^ĞĚůĞǇ ?ƐĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĂůŽĨ
Chesterfieldian politeness is embodied in a novel attributed to one of the most prominent 
and notorious female members of the bon ton, Georgiana Cavendish, Duchess of 
Devonshire. To the British public, the Duchess epitomized the grand lady of fashion but she 
also symbolised the apogee of aristocratic vice. In 1779, The Sylph was published; an 
epistolary novel featuring a young woŵĂŶ “ƵŶůĞĂƌŶĞĚŝŶƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚĞǁŽƌůĚ ? who marries one 
of Chesterfield's pupils of pleasure. The novel plays with the Richardsonian idea of the 
provincial young heroine who is snatched up by a man who cannot resist her, only to 
discover that as soon as they reach Town and enter the ton, she is as far removed from 
virtue and innocence as she is from Wales. In this extract (14), she refers to the need for a 
 ‘dictionary ŽĨƉŽůŝƚĞƉŚƌĂƐĞƐ ? because she is unable to understand the talk of the town: 
 
(14)  I blush twenty times a day at my own stupidity, --ĂŶĚƚŚĞŶƐŝƌtŝůůŝĂŵƚĞůůƐŵĞ ? “ŝƚŝƐ
 ƐŽŝŵŵĞŶƐĞůǇ ‘bere ƚŽďůƵƐŚ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŵĂŬĞƐŵĞďůƵƐŚƚĞŶƚŝŵĞƐŵŽƌĞďĞĐĂƵƐĞ/ĚŽŶ ?ƚ
 understand what he means by that expression, and I am afraid to discover my 
 ignorance; and he has not patience to explain every ambiguous word he uses but 
 cries, shrugging up his shoulders, ah! quel savage! and then composes his ruffled 
 spirits by humming an Italian air. (Devonshire, 1779, 1: 62). 
 
JƵůŝĂ ?Ɛ “ƐƚƵƉŝĚŝƚǇ ? ĂŶĚ “ŝŐŶŽƌĂŶĐĞ ? arise from her lack of familiarity with the code adopted 
by her husband, Sir William. He in turn affects frustration at her gaucheness (hence her 
blushing) and her naiveté and exacerbates the situation by using the code, which includes 
French phrases, ƌĞĐĂůůŝŶŐŚĞƐƚĞƌĨŝĞůĚ ?ƐĂĚǀŝĐĞŽŶĐŽŶǀersing with women in example (10). 
Julia also ruminates on the content of what Sir William repƌĞƐĞŶƚƐƚŽŚĞƌĂƐ “ƉŽůŝƚĞůŝĨĞ ?:  
 
(15) [Sir William] may have a high opinion of my integrity and discretion; but he ought in 
 my mind to have reflected how very young I was; and, he scruples not frequently to 
 say, how totally unlearned in polite life. . . . I am following the taste of Sir William;  
 but I am (if I may be allowed to say so) too artless. Perhaps what I think is his  
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 inclination, may be only to make trial of my natural disposition. Though he may  
 choose to live in the highest ton, he may secretly wish his wife a more retired turn.  
 How then shall I act? I do every thing with a cheerful countenance; but that proceeds  
 from my desire of pleasing him. I accommodate myself to what I think is his taste;  
 but owing to my ignorance of mankind, I may be defeating my own purpose. I once  
 slightly hinted as much to Lady Besford. She burst out into a fit of laughter at my  
 duteous principles. I supposed I was wrong, by exciting her mirth: this is not the  
 method of reforming me from my errors; but thus I am; but thus I am in general  
 treated. It reminds me of a character in the Spectator, who, being very beautiful, was  
 kept in perfect ignorance of every thing, and who, when she made any enquiry in  
 order to gain knowledge, ǁĂƐĂůǁĂǇƐƉƵƚďǇ ?ǁŝƚŚ ? “zŽƵĂƌĞƚŽŽŚĂŶĚƐŽŵĞƚŽƚƌŽƵďůĞ 
 ǇŽƵƌƐĞůĨĂďŽƵƚƐƵĐŚƚŚŝŶŐƐ ? ?dŚŝƐ ?ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĨĂƐŚŝŽŶ ?ŵĂǇďĞƉŽůŝƚĞ ?
 but I am sure it is neither friendly nor satisfactory. (Devonshire, 1779, 1: 132-134) 
 
 Julia ŚĂƐƚŽŐƵĞƐƐĂƚŚĞƌƐŽƉŚŝƐƚŝĐĂƚĞĚŚƵƐďĂŶĚ ?ƐĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨŚĞƌ ?ƐŚĞǁĂŶƚƐƚo 
please him but it is not obvious to her what she must do and nobody will tell her how to 
achieve this end. :ƵůŝĂ ?Ɛ Spectator allusion offers the occasion to review the content of 
politeness. We infer that its construction as flattery without true consideration of the 
subject is taken from the Spectator critique of politeness in the absence of sincerity, good 
nature and affability.  ĂǀĞŶĚŝƐŚ ?ƐũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚŬĞĞping Julia in ignorance may be 
 “ƉŽůŝƚĞ ? ?ďƵƚƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐŶĞŝƚŚĞƌ “ĨƌŝĞŶĚůǇ ?ŶŽƌ “satisfĂĐƚŽƌǇ ? recalls Adam Fitz-ĚĂŵ ?Ɛ
distinction of politeness from true consideration for others. Cavendish (an insider) thus 
appears to play wŝƚŚƚŚĞŚĞƐƚĞƌĨŝĞůĚŝĂŶƵƐĞŽĨ “ƉŽůŝƚĞ ? to describe the fashionable upper-
class metropolitan milieu, what Julia ĐĂůůƐƚŚĞ “highest ton ?. 
 dŚĞǀĂŝŶĂƚƚĞŵƉƚŽĨĂǀĞŶĚŝƐŚ ?ƐŚĞƌŽŝŶĞ ?:ƵůŝĂ ?ƚŽĂƐĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚŚĞƚĂƐƚĞŽĨŚĞƌ ?ǀŝĐŝŽƵƐ
but polite) husband and to act accordingly illustrates the enduring perception that the city is 
the locus of sophistication and vice.  Addison describes ^ŝƌtŝůůŝĂŵ ?ƐƚǇƉĞŝŶŚŝƐSpectator 
119 (Tuesday, July 17,  ? ? ? ? ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚŚĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞƐĂ “Revolution in the Point of Good 
Breeding, which relates to the ŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝŽŶĂŵŽŶŐDĞŶŽĨDŽĚĞ ? ?ŶŽƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚǁŚĞƌĞĂƐ
ŽŶĐĞ ? “[i]t was certainly one of the first Distinctions of a well-bred Man to express every 
thing that the most remote Appearance of being obscene in modest Terms and distant 
WŚƌĂƐĞƐ ?,  
(16) at present several of our Men of the Town, and particularly those who have been 
 polished in France, make use of the most coarse uncivilized Words in our Language, 
 and utter themselves often in such a manner as a Clown would blush to hear. This 
 infamous Piece of Good Breeding, which reigns among the Coxcombs of the Town, 
 has not yet made its way into the Country; (Spectator 119, Tuesday, July 17, 1711) 
 
ĚĚŝƐŽŶ ?Ɛ “iŶĨĂŵŽƵƐWŝĞĐĞŽĨ'ŽŽĚƌĞĞĚŝŶŐ ?refers to the behaviour of fashionable city 
ŵĞŶǁŚŽŚĂĚďĞĞŶ “polished in France ?, behaviour which seems to persist among 
metropolitan men for much of the ceŶƚƵƌǇ ?,ĞƌĞ “'ŽŽĚƌĞĞĚŝŶŐ ? has more to do with a 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌĨŽƌŵŽĨůĞĂƌŶĞĚďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌƚŚĂŶ^ŚĂĨƚĞƐďƵƌǇ ?ƐŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨƉŽůŝƚĞŐŽŽĚďƌĞĞĚŝŶŐĂƐ
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ĂŶŝŶŶĂƚĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇŽĨĂƌŝƐƚŽĐƌĂƚŝĐŵĞŶĂŶĚƚŚƵƐƐĞĞŵƐƚŽĂŶƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞŚĞƐƚĞƌĨŝĞůĚ ?ƐƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ
term.  By the last quarter of the century, then, there is evidence that the Spectator remains 
a source for the evaluation of conversation in terms of politeness as a sociable mode of 
ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?ƚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƚŝŵĞ ?ƚŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨƉŽůŝƚĞŝŶƚĞƌĐŽƵƌƐĞĂƐŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚƚŽƉůĞĂƐĞŽŶĞ ?Ɛ
interlocutor even if it means not being true to oneself (complaisance without sincerity) is 
well established as a tenet of good manners (politic behaviour). Labelling a particular class 
or group of people and their attributes ĂƐ “ƉŽůŝƚĞ ? carries other (negative) implications and 
connotations. The persistent association of  “ƉŽůŝƚĞƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ǁŝƚŚ “ŐŽŽĚďƌĞĞĚŝŶŐ ? results in 
the ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ “ƉŽůŝƚĞ ? as a means of (negatively) classifying a particular social 
group (metropolitan, noble or upper rank males). As evidenced by the critiques mounted by 
Henry Hodgson and Samuel Jackson Pratt, the middling sorts both envy and fear what they 
judge to be the moral turpitude of the ton,  “ƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚĞƌƉĂƌƚŽĨŵĂŶŬŝŶĚ ?, as they observe 
them from a social distance. 
 However, extricated from the life and person of the author himself, ŚĞƐƚĞƌĨŝĞůĚ ?Ɛ 
published letters were regarded as recipes for correct and refined speech, the acquisition of 
accomplishments like dancing, table manners and comportment.  For instance, the Rev. Dr. 
:ŽŚŶdƌƵƐůĞƌ “ĚŝŐĞƐƚĞĚĂŶĚŵĞƚŚŽĚŝƐĞĚ ? ŚĞƐƚĞƌĨŝĞůĚ ?ƐůĞƚƚĞƌƐ ?ƉƵďůŝƐŚŝŶŐƚŚĞŵĂƐPrinciples 
of Politeness in 1775 (producing more than twenty editions thereafter) (Major, 2004). The 
ƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƌĞĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŽĨŚĞƐƚĞƌĨŝĞůĚ ?ƐůĞƚƚĞƌƐŝůůƵŵŝŶĂƚĞs the way in which mid-
ĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ “ƉŽůŝƚĞŶĞƐƐ ? is realized and received as mere etiquette in the last quarter of the 
century.  Indeed, despite being reviled for the cynical and self-serving notions of politeness 
and manners elaborated ?ŚĞƐƚĞƌĨŝĞůĚ ?Ɛ>ĞƚƚĞƌƐǁĞƌe immensely popular.8 Langford (1991: 
542) comments that  “ŵƵĐŚŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƉŽůŝƚĞŶĞƐƐ ? ƉƌŝŶƚĞĚƵŶĚĞƌŚĞƐƚĞƌĨŝĞůĚ ?ƐŶĂŵĞ
commended itself to those who sought a guide to the canons of contemporary gentility ?. 
According to John Brewer (1997: 183) ?ŚĞƐƚĞƌĨŝĞůĚ ?Ɛ Letters to his Son was the most popular 
book classified as belles-lettres borrowed by the members of the Bristol library between 
 ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚ ? ? ? ? ?ĨŽůůŽǁĞĚďǇ^ƚĞƌŶĞ ?ƐTristram Shandy.  These borrowers were likely to be 
members of the ĐŝƚǇ ?ƐĞůŝƚĞƐĂŶĚŵĞƌĐŚĂŶƚĂŶĚƚƌĂĚŝŶŐĐůĂƐƐĞƐ ?
 The extent to whŝĐŚƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĂůĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ “ƉŽůŝƚĞŶĞƐƐ ? shifts to accommodate 
good manners, whether conducted with sincerity or not, is expressed in a late eighteenth-
century guide ĨŽƌ “all who would either write or spĞĂŬǁŝƚŚWƌŽƉƌŝĞƚǇĂŶĚůĞŐĂŶĐĞ ?, under 
the headings  “ŽŵƉůĂŝƐĂŶƚ ?WŽůŝƚĞ ?tĞůů-ďƌĞĚ ?: 
 
(17)     Complaisance rises from the respect we shew those whom we meet; is sometimes 
 sincere, sometimes not; politeness, from the flattering methods we make use of in 
 our behaviour and conversation, and is generally insincere; but to be well-bred is to 
 shew the same honours always with sincerity. 
    Complaisance is the characteristic of the lover; politeness of the courtier; but to be 
well-bred denotes the gentleman. 
                                                 
8
 ĐƵƌƐŽƌǇƐĞĂƌĐŚŽĨKĨŽƌĞĚŝƚŝŽŶƐŽĨŚĞƐƚĞƌĨŝĞůĚ ?ƐLetters to his Son indicate no fewer than ten separate 
editions published in England, Ireland and America between 1774 and 1797.  
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    We should be complaisant without importunity; and polite without insipidity. The 
distinguishing mark of a well-bred man is the constant care he takes never to disgust 
or offend (Trusler 1783: 86). 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, as a cŽŵƉŝůĞƌŽĨŚĞƐƚĞƌĨŝĞůĚ ?ƐůĞƚƚĞƌƐĂŶĚĂƐĂǁƌŝƚĞƌŽĨŐƵŝĚĞƐĨŽƌ
the edification and education of young people, Rev. Dr. John Trusler presents readings of 
the keywords complaisance and polite that are indebted to Chesterfield. He invokes 
sincerity in his attempt to distinguish among the terms; he presents politeness ĂƐ “ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ
ŝŶƐŝŶĐĞƌĞ ?ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐďĞŝŶŐ “ǁĞůů-ďƌĞĚ ? involves performing the same offices, but  “ǁŝƚŚ
ƐŝŶĐĞƌŝƚǇ ?. Complaisance, the term that appears to be most consistently associated with 
politeness, may be sincere or insincere. Trusler attributes these terms to different ranks (of 
men): the lover, the courtier and the gentleman, and in the process, offers a set of socially 
nuanced, gendered distinctions. At the same time, by yoking together in this way the figures 
of the lover, the (Renaissance) courtier and the late eighteenth-century gentleman, he 
removes the terms from their historical contexts, arguably reinvigorating them for the 
period.9 
 By the last quarter of the eighteenth century, politeness remains contingently 
polysemous, commanding a number of interpretations and uses for different people. It is 
persistently used to classify a particular group ? metropolitan, aristocratic people, mainly 
men ? and their behaviour: what the Spectator hĂĚůĂďĞůůĞĚ “ƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚĞƌƉĂƌƚŽĨŵĂŶŬŝŶĚ ? 
(Spectator 119, TueƐĚĂǇ:ƵůǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?&ŽƌƚŚŝƐ “ƉŽůŝƚĞ ? class, identified with ŚĞƐƚĞƌĨŝĞůĚ ?Ɛ
system by the end of the period, politeness has positive connotations of self-interest and 
egotistical advantage. For those outside this class who are the observers, and perhaps the 
recipients (victims) of this behaviour ?ůŝŬĞĂǀĞŶĚŝƐŚ ?Ɛ:ƵůŝĂ (a product and practice of this 
peculiarly metropolitan masculine group), politeness is vicious and harmful.  
 However, when dissociated from a particular group of people, and concentrated into 
a primer designed to instruct young people in the arts of conversation, manners and 
comportment in company, politeness is understood to be positively beneficial and 
educational. ChesterfiĞůĚ ?Ɛ(amoral) brand of politeness was re-analysed and rehabilitated in 
the world of the middling sorts so that politeness was recast as manners in moral terms. The 
evidence for this moral reanalysis lies in the ƌĞŐƵůĂƌŝƚǇǁŝƚŚǁŚŝĐŚ “miscellaneous pieces 
selected from the ďĞƐƚŶŐůŝƐŚǁƌŝƚĞƌƐ ?ĂƌĞ “ĚŝƐƉŽƐĞĚƵŶĚĞƌƉƌŽƉĞƌŚĞĂĚƐ ?ŝŶĂŶƚŚŽůŽŐŝĞƐ
ĨŽƌƚŚĞ “improvement oĨǇŽƵƚŚŝŶƌĞĂĚŝŶŐĂŶĚƐƉĞĂŬŝŶŐ ? such as that produced by William 
Enfield (1774). This particular collectŝŽŶŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞŚĞĂĚŝŶŐ “ŝĚĂĐƚŝĐ ƉŝĞĐĞƐ ?, 
Spectator ƉŝĞĐĞƐ “KŶDŽĚĞƐƚǇ ?ĂŶĚ “KŶŚĞĂƌĨƵůŶĞƐƐ ? ?ĂŶĞǆƚƌĂĐ ? “KŶ^ŝŶĐĞƌŝƚǇ ?, from 
Tillotson, the Guardian ?Ɛ “KŶ,ŽŶŽƵƌ ? ?ĂŶĚĂƉŝĞĐĞĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ “On the Advantages of uniting 
Gentleness of Manners wŝƚŚ&ŝƌŵŶĞƐƐŽĨDŝŶĚ ?, attributed to Lord Chesterfield.  This and 
other examples illustrate that the notion of politeness was constructed as positively 
beneficial and educational, as a set of virtues that could be acquired to the credit of the 
subject. Politeness could be construed as and, indeed, became a cover term for good 
                                                 
9
 See Carter (2002: 337) for discussion of eighteenth-century treatments of the Renaissance courtier.  
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manners: the collection of a priori rules and prohibitions governing the appropriate conduct 
of social interaction with others. 
 
5.    Contingent polysemy and the role of sincerity in the moral rehabilitation of politeness 
 To test the apparent resolution of the tensions attending the interpretation and 
practice of politeness throughout the eighteenth century in the distillation of politeness as 
ŐŽŽĚŵĂŶŶĞƌƐĨŽƌŵŝĚĚůĞĐůĂƐƐƵƐĂŐĞ ?ůĞƚ ?ƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌ one last piece of evidence, provided by 
Jane Austen. In Sense and Sensibility (1811), Austen gives us occasion to reflect on the social 
good that politeness ? good manners ? can do.  In this novel, (true) politeness is, in 
pragmatic terms, politic behaviour. It consists of behaviour that has content: demeanour, 
attitude, tone of voice, as well as table manners, decorum, comportment, self-control and 
good sense. As politic behaviour, it is appropriate both to the situation and to the company. 
Equally, when speakers demonstrate minimal control of its forms and little regard for the 
nature of the situation, with negative effects, they are shown to be impolite. In the 
following example (18), the heroine, Elinor Dashwood, encounters Robert Ferrars whose 
 “gay unconcern ?ĂŶĚ “happy self-complacency of his manner ?ĐĞŵĞŶƚ “her most 
unfavourablĞŽƉŝŶŝŽŶŽĨŚŝƐŚĞĂĚĂŶĚŚĞĂƌƚ ?.  She observes the reaction of Robert Ferrars to 
the news that his brother Edward has ƐĞĐƵƌĞĚĂĐůĞƌŐǇŵĂŶ ?ƐůŝǀŝŶŐƚŽĞŶĂďůĞŚŝŵƚŽŵĂƌƌǇ
Lucy Steele, a social inferior.  Specifically, he bursts ŝŶƚŽŝŶƚĞŵƉĞƌĂƚĞĂŶĚŝŶůŝŶŽƌ ?ƐŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ, 
 “ŝŵŵŽĚĞƌĂƚĞ ? laughter: 
 
(18)       Elinor, while she waited in silence and immovable gravity the conclusion of such 
 folly, could not restrain her eyes from being fixed on him with a look that spoke all 
 the contempt it excited. It was a look, however, very well bestowed, for it relieved 
 her own feelings and gave no intelligence to him. He was recalled from wit to 
 wisdom, not by any reproof of hers but by his own sensibility. 
      “tĞŵĂǇƚƌĞĂƚŝƚĂƐĂũŽŬĞ ? ?ƐĂŝĚŚĞĂƚůĂƐƚ ?ƌĞĐŽǀĞƌŝŶŐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĂĨĨĞĐƚĞĚůĂƵŐŚ
which had considerably lengthened out the genuine gaiety of the moment-- “ďƵƚ
upon my soul, it is a most serious business. Poor Edward! He is ruined forever. I am 
extremely sorry for it ? for I know him to be a very good-hearted creature, as well-
meaning a fellow, perhaps, as any in the world. You must not judge of him, Miss 
Dashwood, from your slight acquaintance. ? Poor Edward!----His manners are 
certainly not the happiest in nature. ? But we are not all born, you know, with the 
same powers ? the same address. ? Poor fellow! ? to see him in a circle of strangers! 
(Austen, 1811: 251)  
 
 :ĂŶĞƵƐƚĞŶ ?ƐƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚŽĨŚĞƌƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞ ŚĞƌŽŝŶĞ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽZŽďĞƌƚ&ĞƌƌĂƌs ?Ɛ
extreme ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞĂƉƉĞĂƌƐƚŽŽǁĞƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐƚŽŚĞƐƚĞƌĨŝĞůĚ ?ƐŝŶũƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐƚŽŚŝƐƐŽŶĂďŽƵƚ
polite behaviour. Specifically, ůŝŶŽƌ ?ƐĚĞŵĞĂŶŽƵƌ and attitude ?ŚĞƌ “ƐŝůĞŶĐĞ ? ?ŚĞƌ
 “ŝŵŵŽǀĂďůĞŐƌĂǀŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ “ůŽŽŬƚŚĂƚƐƉŽŬĞ ? ? ?ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉƚ ? ?recall ŚĞƐƚĞƌĨŝĞůĚ ?Ɛ
instructions about dissimulation. Elinor demonstrates her command of self-control, of 
maintaining her composure so that her true feelings may escape detection.  Thus ůŝŶŽƌ ?Ɛ
 “look ? allows her to express her contempt without actually communicating it to her 
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interlocutor.  In contrast, Ferrars exhibits a distinct lack of self-control in his extravagant 
behaviour. She waits for Ferrars to recover his  “ǁŝƐĚŽŵ ? through ŚŝƐŽǁŶ “ƐĞŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ? (here, 
the settling of his violent emotions), and allows him to comment on ƚŚĞ “ũŽŬĞ ?, which he 
does, lamenting that his brother ?Ɛ “manners are certaŝŶůǇŶŽƚƚŚĞŚĂƉƉŝĞƐƚŝŶŶĂƚƵƌĞ ?. 
Ironically, as he declares that his brother ĚǁĂƌĚůĂĐŬƐ “the same powers ? the same 
ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐ ?, Robert Ferrars reveals that he himself does not satisfy the expectations of a true 
gentleman as prescribed by Chesterfield.  Elinor practises ŚĞƐƚĞƌĨŝĞůĚ ?ƐƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐŽĨ
politeness, no doubt mediated by the work of compilers such as Trusler and Enfield, to good 
effect. She embodies the neutral and measured performance of conversational manners, 
ensuring she does not reveal her true feelings. In contrast, Robert Ferrars displays the 
behaviour borne ĨƌŽŵ “hiƐŽǁŶĚŝƐƐŝƉĂƚĞĚĐŽƵƌƐĞŽĨůŝĨĞ ?; he represents all that Chesterfield 
enjoins his son to avoid as a gentleman. Austen thus appropriates key aspects of 
ŚĞƐƚĞƌĨŝĞůĚŝĂŶ “Ăƌƚ ?ĂŶĚ “ŐŽŽĚ-ďƌĞĞĚŝŶŐ ? and demonstrates how they can be shown to be 
used virtuously as well as viciously.  Tandon (2003: 18) notes that by the time Austen came 
to write fictioŶŝŶƚŚĞůĂƚĞ ? ? ? ?Ɛ ?ƐŚĞĐŽƵůĚ “not rely on conversational manners as naturally 
virtuous, binding forces, even as she made dialogue one of her major stylistic and ethical 
techniques ? ?,ĞŽďƐĞƌǀĞƐƚŚĂƚ “between the time of The Spectator and Northanger 
Abbey ?ƚŚĞ ‘ĐƵůƚƵƌĞŽĨƉŽůŝƚĞŶĞƐƐ ? had become more disparate and threatened, bearing 
diverse and often perverƐĞĨƌƵŝƚƐ ? (2003: 18). For Austen, then, politeness is demonstrably 
contingently polysemous.  
 
6. Concluding remarks:  
The universe of eighteenth-century discourse as represented by the texts witnesses the 
persistence of the construction of politeness in conversational interaction as highly 
dependent upon the identity of speakers: their social rank and status and, crucially, their 
gender.  Masculine politeness is associated with egotistical civility on the one hand ? as 
ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĚŝŶŚĞƐƚĞƌĨŝĞůĚ ?ƐƐǇƐƚĞŵĨŽƌŵĂůĞĞƚŝƋƵĞƚƚĞĂŶĚŝƚƐƌĞĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ? and altruistic 
sociability on the other ? as embodied in the Spectator papers. In this regard, women are 
excluded from the masculine social sphere, as illustrated in the fictional treatment by Mary 
Collyer and Georgiana Cavendish.  However, in the last decades of the eighteenth century, 
politeness comes to be understood as positively beneficial and educational and accessible to 
women. ŚĞƐƚĞƌĨŝĞůĚ ?Ɛ ?ĂŵŽƌĂů ?ďƌĂŶĚŽĨƉŽůŝƚĞŶĞƐƐǁĂƐƌĞ-analysed and rehabilitated in the 
world of the middling sorts so that politeness was recast as manners in moral terms. Finally, 
:ĂŶĞƵƐƚĞŶ ?ƐďƌĂŶĚŽĨƉŽůŝƚĞŶĞƐƐ ?as altruistic manners finely judged according to 
situation, space and speakers ? establishes the predominant meaning of politeness today. As 
speakers understand sincerity ĂƐ “ŐĞŶƵŝŶĞŶĞƐƐŽĨĨĞĞůŝŶŐ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĂƐ “ŚŽŶĞƐƚǇ ? ?ŝƚ
becomes easier to construe and adopt a politeness that is considerateness without having 
to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of being honest.  
The evidence, garnered from a range of eighteenth-century sources, indicates that 
meanings of the term politeness co-exist and compete in a relationship of contingent 
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ƉŽůǇƐĞŵǇ ?dŚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ ?ƐƉŽůǇƐĞŵǇǀĂƌŝĞƐĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞƐƉĞĂŬĞƌ ?ƐŽƚŚĂƚ
particular meanings are more prominent for one person than for another depending upon 
their historical setting, personal and social identity and experiential stance.  Over time, 
some meanings strengthen and influence the construal of the term while others fall out of 
use and disappear.  The notion of sincerity is a critical component of the specific discursive 
context in which individuals apprehend the content of polite behaviour and evaluate it as 
virtuous or vicious. The (semasiological) history of the term politeness includes the semantic 
change of sincerity; politeness shifts over time from referring to a mode of (honest) sociable 
interaction to a display of (genuinely felt) personal manners.  
The (onomasiological) history of the concept of politeness consists of a shifting 
lexicon that is reflected in our source texts; in some, the notion of politeness is associated 
with breeding, masculinity and flattery, in others, good nature, simplicity and openness, or 
selfishness, ceremony and civility, and in still others, it is associated with self-control, 
considerateness and manners. This analysis indicates that the semantic differences between 
>ĂŶŐĨŽƌĚ ?ƐŵŽĚĞƐŽĨĞŝŐŚƚĞĞŶƚŚ-century politeness are both more ephemeral and more 
fluid than they seem.   
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